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* Honorable Richard D. Cudahy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by
designation.
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OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Leslie W. Albury challenges the district court’s denial of his appeal from the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s determination that he is not
entitled to disability insurance benefits.  Because we find that the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and that any legal error was harmless, we
will affirm the district court.
I
Since we write only for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts of this case
except insofar as may be helpful to our brief discussion.
On January 10, 1997, Albury applied for disability insurance benefits based on
injuries to his left knee and back suffered in a 1994 car accident.  Tr. 163.  After
undergoing surgery and physical therapy for both injuries, his treating physician, Dr.
Berkowitz, found that Albury had “full range of motion [and] no instability” in his knee
and “full range of motion [and] no evidence of neurological deficit” in his back.  Tr. 157-
58.  Dr. Berkowitz cleared him to perform “light duty” as of July 10, 1995.  Tr. 159.
In 1997, after applying for benefits, Albury was examined by Dr. Bagner.  Tr. 168-
69.  Dr. Bagner found that, despite some pain, Albury had a “normal range of movement”
in both his knee and back.  Id.   Finally, Albury was examined by Dr. Riss in 1997 and
31998.  Dr. Riss concluded that Albury was 100% disabled.  Tr. 180.
On January 29, 1999, the ALJ found that Albury was not entitled to disability
insurance benefits.  Tr. 14-20.  The decision was affirmed by the Commissioner on May
13, 2000 Tr. 7-8.  The district court denied Albury’s appeal from the Commissioner’s
decision on February 24, 2003.  Albury filed a timely appeal to this Court.
II
To determine whether a person is “disabled” and thus entitled to benefits, the
Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process.  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4).  Although we exercise plenary review of legal issues, Schaudeck v.
Commissioner, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999), the Commissioner’s factual findings
must be upheld so long as they are supported by “substantial evidence.”  42 U.S.C. §
405(g).  “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a
suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.  It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . . .”  N.L.R.B. v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).  Albury challenges the ALJ’s findings at Steps 3 and 5.  We
will address each in turn.
A. Step 3 – Listings
At Step 3, if the claimant can establish that his or her impairment(s) “meets or
equals” one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (“Listings”),
1  At Steps 1 and 2, the ALJ found that Albury had not been engaged in
“substantial gainful activity” since January 1, 1995, and his back and knee impairments
were “severe.”  § 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(ii).
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he/she will be found to be disabled without any further inquiry.  § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).1 
The disabilities set forth in each Listing are “presumed to prevent a person from pursuing
any gainful work . . . .”  Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, if
the claimant’s impairment(s) does not meet or equal any of the Listings, the ALJ will
continue to Step 4 of the sequential analysis.  In this case, the ALJ found that Albury’s
impairments, while severe, did not meet or equal any of the Listings.  A.R. 19.
First, Albury contends that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss any of the specific
Listings at Step 3.  In support of this position, he relies on Burnett v. Commissioner, 220
F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2000).  In Burnett, the ALJ did nothing more than state his conclusion
that the claimant’s “impairment failed to equal the level of severity of any [of the
Listings].”  Id. at 119.  We found that this conclusory statement was inadequate because it
did not allow for meaningful judicial review.  We remanded the matter and instructed the
ALJ to “fully develop the record and explain his findings at step three, including an
analysis of whether and why Burnett’s back and knee impairments, or those impairments
combined, are or are not equivalent in severity to one of the listed impairments.”  Id. at
120.  In contrast, the ALJ here discussed all of the relevant medical evidence before
concluding that Albury was not entitled to disability insurance benefits.  Albury argues
2 Burnett does not expressly hold that the ALJ must discuss the applicable
Listing(s) in his/her decision.
3 Albury also argues that he has to alternate between sitting and standing. 
Appellant’s Brief at 24-25.  However, there is no medical evidence supporting such a
limitation.
5
that the ALJ was required to discuss the applicable Listings in his opinion.  While this
would have been helpful, and may even be required by Burnett,2 our primary concern has
always been the ability to conduct meaningful judicial review.  See Burnett, 220 F.3d at
119.  Because the ALJ’s decision in this case allows for such review, any error was
harmless because the decision is still supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ’s
decision is explained in sufficient detail to allow meaningful review.
Next, Albury argues that his knee and back impairments meet or equal Listings
1.03 and 1.05C (1999).  However, he cites no medical evidence in the record to support
this.  More importantly, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to the
contrary.  The ALJ placed great weight on treating physician Dr. Berkowitz’s opinion that
Albury had “full range of motion” in his knee and back, and that he could return to “light
duty.”  Tr. 157-59.  This opinion was supported by examining physician Dr. Bagner who
also found that, despite some pain, Albury’s knee and back exhibited a “normal range of
movement.”  Tr. 169.  The ALJ also considered contrary findings in the record.3 
Specifically, he rejected the report of examining physician Dr. Riss–who found that
Albury was 100% disabled (Tr. 176-180)–because Dr. Riss’ opinion was inconsistent
with the findings of Drs. Berkowitz and Bagner.  Thus, the ALJ fulfilled his obligation to
6provide not only “an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result,
but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected.”  Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).  Moreover, we have held that greater weight should be accorded
the findings of a treating physician (e.g., Dr. Berkowitz) as compared to the findings of a
physician who has merely examined the claimant (e.g., Dr. Riss).  Adorno, 40 F.3d at 47.
Finally, Albury contends that the ALJ did not properly consider his subjective
complaints of severe pain.  Appellant’s Brief at 19.  Although pain alone can be
disabling, Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1068 (3d Cir. 1984), the ALJ found that
Albury’s claims were not supported by the record.  Tr. 19.  That finding is supported by
the medical opinions of Drs. Berkowitz and Bagner.  Id.  Dr. Berkowitz indicated that
Albury “can heal and toe walk without difficulty” and “does his stretching exercises
well.”  Tr. 159.  Similarly, Dr. Bagner noted: 
[Albury] gets on and off of the exam table without difficulty and dressed
and undressed without assistance.  He is not uncomfortable in the seated
position during the interview.  He can heel and toe walk.  He does not use a
cane or other assistive device.
Tr. 169.  Based on these findings, the ALJ again rejected the contrary opinion of Dr. Riss. 
Tr. 18.  Thus, he properly considered and rejected Albury’s subjective claims of pain.  See
Green, 749 F.2d at 1068.
We therefore find that the ALJ’s finding that Albury’s impairments do not meet or
4 Albury asserts that because he “almost meets the severity of two separate
Listings, combined he should be disabled.”  Appellant’s Brief at 19.  He also argues that
the ALJ should have considered non-severe impairments to his groin and wrist. 
Appellant’s Brief at 19.  However, he offers no legal or factual support for either of these
assertions.  Finally, he contends that remand is warranted because the relevant Listings
have been substantially revised as of February 2002.  Appellant’s Brief at 20.  However,
the revised Listings only apply to claims pending at the administrative level on or after
the effective date of the revision.  66 F.R. 58011-12.  The Commissioner issued a final
decision on Albury’s claim in 2000.  Tr. 7.
 
5 At Step 4, §  404.1520(a)(4)(iv), the ALJ found that Albury could not return to his
past employment as a hospital orderly, which required him to perform heavy to very
heavy work.  Tr. 18, 19.
 
6 The Commissioner may also rely on a vocational expert.  Sykes, 228 F.3d at 263.
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equal any of the Listings is supported by substantial evidence here.4
B. Step 5 – Ability to Perform Other Work
At the fifth and final step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to determine
whether the claimant can “make an adjustment to other work.”  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(v).5  In order to make this determination, the Commissioner may use the
medical-vocational guidelines (“grids”).  Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citing Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983)).6  “The grids consist of a matrix
of four factors–physical ability, age, education, and work experience–and set forth rules
that identify whether jobs requiring specific combinations of these factors exist in
significant numbers in the national economy which establish the types and numbers of
jobs that exist in the national economy for claimant’s with exertional impairments.”  Id. 
However, the grids may not be used to determine the impact of nonexertional limitations,
7 The ALJ also indicated that Albury was a younger individual (42) with limited
education (10th grade) and that transferability of work skills was immaterial.  Tr. 19-20.
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such as pain.  See Sykes, 228 F.3d at 261.   However, since the ALJ properly rejected
Albury’s subjective claims of pain, see supra IIA, he was permitted to rely exclusively on
the grids.  
Using the grids, the ALJ found that Albury had the residual functional capacity to
perform the “full range of light work” and was therefore not disabled.  Tr. at 19-20.7 
“Light work” is defined as: 
lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of
objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be
very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking
or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing
and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing
a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we
determine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are
additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for
long periods of time.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).  The ALJ’s decision at Step 5 is also supported by substantial
evidence and not based on any legal error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we will affirm the district court.
____________
